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Abstract and Introduction 
UK company law in its arguably insular shareholder-focused framework, has come under questions 
of fitness for purpose1 in the continuing litany of corporate malpractices and scandals2 since the 
1992 resolve to reform corporate governance.3 The excessive focus on shareholder interests, rights 
and powers in UK company law is starting to reveal failures that not only jeopardise companies’ 
viability but also give rise to adverse social impact. We argue that the shareholder primacy-led 
foundations for UK company law should be revisited, and that the adoption of a stakeholder 
conception in company law can be both normatively and positively supported. We suggest the 
contours of legal reform in company law: to introduce stakeholder covenants with the company, and 
recalibrate shareholder powers and enforcement. We believe that these key aspects of reform are 
possible and important to usher in a new framework for company law that will address the efficiency 
and social legitimacy needs of the company.  
A. The Case for Moving From Shareholder Primacy to a Stakeholder Conception in Company 
Law 
The company is the most popular business form in the UK,4 and modern companies drive 
many forms of wealth creation,5 realising the capitalist vision of rewarding productivity fairly 
in a free market.6 In the UK, the legal construct of the company is a ‘separate legal person’7 
                                                          
*Professor of Corporate Law and Financial Regulation, University College London. The author has presented 
this paper at the Contemporary Issues in Company and Financial Law workshop at HTW Berlin, 16 Dec 2016, 
and thanks Gudula Deipenbrock, Maren Heidemann, Dionysia Katelouzou for comments. I also thank two 
anonymous reviewers for their feedback on an earlier draft. All errors and omissions are mine. This article is 
based on a submission to the Parliament Inquiry made by the author and Dr Roger Barker on reform in UK 
company law, at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2858903. 
1 See http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/business-innovation-
and-skills/news-parliament-2015/corporate-governance-inquiry-launch-16-17/. 
2 From the failure of Polly Peck, Maxwell and BCCI in the 1990s to the failures of American giants Enron and 
World.com in the early 2000s, and the failure of Rover in the UK at about the same period, the onset and near-
failure of giant banking corporations in 2007-9, and most recently the failure of BHS in the UK in 2016. 
3 The Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance introduced in 1992 in response to the failures of Polly Peck, 
Maxwell and BCCI. 
4 For example see Companies House, Statistical Release: Company Register Activities 2014/5. 
5 It was recognised by the 1960s that much of capitalist industry would be channelled through the institution 
of the corporation and this remains so today, see JK Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1966) setting out the 
importance of institutional economics. 
6 See for example an exposition of how productive capital is deployed across different actors who are 
rewarded by domestic or foreign trade, in Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
subject to  decision-making by the ‘Board of Directors’8 and, to a greater latitude than in 
many jurisdictions, by shareholders.9  UK company law is based on shareholder primacy,10 
i.e. treating shareholders as (a)the subjects of directors’ accountability,11 (b) the organ to 
exercise key powers in certain aspects of decision-making in the company,12 and (c) the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nations (1776, digital reprint Metalibri 2007) at 
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf at pp281-293. 
7 Well-established since Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1896] UKHL 1. 
8 For example, Art 3, The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 in relation to both private and public 
companies limited by shares reposes the powers of management in the Board of Directors. 
9 For example see the ‘reserve’ power that shareholders can exercise as a body in the general meeting, Art 4, 
The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008 in relation to both private and public companies limited by 
shares. The significantly greater latitude of shareholder powers is discussed in comparison with the US in 
Christopher Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common Law World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2014). 
10 Andrew Keay, ‘Shareholder Primacy in Corporate Law : Can it Survive? Should it Survive?’ (2009) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498065; Joan Laughrey, Andrew Keay and Luca Cerioni, "Legal Practitioners, 
Enlightened Shareholder Value and the Shaping of Corporate Governance" (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 79; in the US see Leo Strine Jnr,‘Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit’ (2012) 47 Wake Forest Law Review 135. 
11 S172, Companies Act 2006 explicitly provides that directors’ duties are to promote the long-term success of 
the company for the benefit of the members as a whole. This has come to be coined as ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’, a long-termist and more inclusive perspective for corporate performance, but revolving 
around shareholders. But most commentators are of the view that the focus on ‘shareholder value’ will 
unlikely introduce any revolutionary move in directors’ conduct towards stakeholders, see for eg Paul Davies, 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the New Responsibilities of Directors’ (2005) at 
http://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1710014/94-
Enlightened_Shareholder_Value_and_the_New_Responsibilities_of_Directors1.pdf; Richard Williams, 
‘Enlightened Shareholder Value in UK Company Law’ (2012) 35 UNSW Law Journal 360; Andrew Keay,"Section 
172(1) of the Companies Act 2006: an Interpretation and Assessment" (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 106; Elaine 
Lynch, ‘Section 172: A Ground-Breaking Reform of Director's Duties, or the Emperor's New Clothes?’ (2012) 
Company Lawyer 196. 
12 Such key aspects include the appointment and removal of directors, see s168, Companies Act 2006; the 
power to approve of certain transactions such as loans and guarantees to directors or substantial transactions 
to directors, long-term incentive arrangements and payments for loss of office, see s188ff; the power to ratify 
directors’ breaches of duties or defaults, s239; the power to direct management in a specific matter by special 
resolution, Art 4, The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008; and a power to approve (or otherwise) 
directors’ remuneration packages on a three-yearly basis, s439A. Shareholders also have extensive powers to 
determine capital restructuring, such as approval of capital reduction or redemption of shares, s641ff, 659; 
and are the key organ to determine if a takeover of the company is approved, see John Armour, Simon Deakin 
and Suzanne J. Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’ (2003) at 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-
papers/wp266.pdf.  
constituents whose capital return interests should form the basis for corporate 
management.13  
Shareholder primacy is based on the economic conception of the company as a ‘nexus of 
contracts’14 where shareholders are regarded to have taken on the riskiest bargain in 
relation to their open-ended commitment of investment in the company.15 Shareholders’ 
open-ended investment commitment provides the foundation for the company to be 
organised into an efficient economic organisation.16 The micro-economic conception of the 
company provides justification for shareholder primacy in UK company law, although the 
importance of shareholders has originated from the evolution of company law from 
partnership law.17  
                                                          
13 Shareholders are treated by economists as ‘residual claimants’, meaning that their supply of capital to the 
company is under an open-ended arrangement which renders them liable to be ultimate losers if the company 
should fail. The ‘residual claimant’ status of the shareholders therefore requires protection so that managers 
do not abuse the privilege of being in control of the use and application of capital. See Armen A Alchian and 
Harold Demsetz,“Production, Information Costs and Economic Organisation” (1972) 62 The American 
Economic Rev 777, Oliver Williamson, “Corporate Governance” (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal 1197. 
14 Traced to Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica  386-405; the contractarian theory of 
the company is a firmly held conception of the company by economists who largely support the freedom of 
bargaining under the organisational umbrella of the corporate form. The firm as a nexus of transactions that 
are off market because of transaction cost efficiency has become a powerful and lasting conception of the 
corporation. See egs William A Klein, “The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints” (1982) 
91 Yale Law Journal 1521; Fred McChesney, “Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique Of 
Eisenberg” (1990) 90 Columbia Law Rev 1332; Manuel A Utset, “Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm” 
(1995) 80 Cornell Law Review 540; David Charny, “Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure Of Contract 
Interpretation” (1991) 89 Michigan Law Review 1815; Stephen Bainbridge, “Community And Statism: A 
Conservative Contractarian Critique Of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship” (1997) 82 Cornell Law Review 
856. 
15 As shareholders bear the open-ended possibility of loss of their capital and are ‘residual claimants’, the key 
risk identified to them is the ‘agency problem’ as managers have discretion to abuse the application of capital 
and deviate from shareholders’ interests, see M Jensen and W Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
16 Hence the efficient bargaining paradigm in light of shareholders’ residual claimant status is that managers 
must manage the company towards shareholder wealth maximisation, see Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R 
Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” in The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press 1991) at 1ff. 
17 The first private company allowed to be incorporated under the 1844 Joint Stock Companies Act envisages 
that at least 7 incorporators must be involved and have unlimited liability, therefore evolving out of 
partnership law. The fusion of the capital providers and management of the company is assumed, as under 
partnership law, until the ‘separation of ownership from control’ developed in the UK in the post-war period 
which also saw significant episodes of company law reform. Brian R Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: 
British Business Transformed (Oxford: OUP 2009). 
Shareholder primacy is a narrow and limited premise for company law, as it does not take 
into account the reality that (a) the economic organisation of the company is made up of 
many more parts than its ‘Board’ or shareholders18 and (b) the societal institution that is the 
corporation serves multifaceted purposes and carries out activities that have impact beyond 
creating shareholder returns.19 The focus on shareholders as the residual claimants of the 
company may work in a micro-economic model of a small private company,20 but fails to 
capture a more complex web of relationships a company can have with other parties that 
contribute productive capital of different types to the company. Moreover, the gaps and 
limits in the shareholder primacy ideology can be exploited, culminating in sub-optimal and 
malpractices in the corporate sector that have social consequences. For example, publicly 
listed companies are often put under pressure to generate quarter-on-quarter share price 
returns in order to be aligned with their institutional shareholders’ interests, resulting in 
corporate short-termism which could sacrifice long-term investments in a company in order 
                                                          
18 Many commentators have pointed out that even taking the nexus of contracts view of the company, there 
are many suppliers of productive capital into the organisational framework and undue focus on shareholders 
obscures the firm-specific commitment of capital made by other stakeholders whose interests are not as 
protected. For eg see Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 
Twenty-First Century (Brookings Institute 1994); Arturo Capasso, ‘Stakeholder Theory and Corporate 
Governance: The Role of Intangible Assets’ at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=610661 
arguing that a resource-based view allows us to more clearly see the extent of committed productive capital 
other stakeholders offer the company. 
19 The sum of the corporation is often greater than its parts, and to an extent the collective entity of the 
company, or ‘the real entity’ interfaces with society (in the form of interdependencies, positive and negative 
externalities and philanthropy), and politics (eg in the form of political donations) in such a way that the 
corporation should not merely be treated as an internalised private bargaining phenomenon. See for example, 
Carl Kaysen, “The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?” in Edward S Mason ed, The Corporation in 
Modern Society (Mass: Harvard University Press 1970) at 85; John E Parkinson, Corporate Power and 
Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995); Philip Blumberg, “The 
Politicization of the Corporation” (1971) 26 Business Lawyer 1551; Susanna Kim Ripken, “Corporations Are 
People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach To The Corporate Personhood Puzzle” (2009) 15 Fordham Journal 
of Corporate and Financial Law 97; Lawrence E Mitchell, “Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Corporate Law” 
(1993) 50 Washington and Lee Law Rev 1477. Also see writings aimed at encouraging the corporation to take 
up responsible citizenship, see Lawrence E Mitchell (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder: Westview Press 
1995); Sally Wheeler, Corporations and the Third Way (Oxford: Hart 2002); Kent Greenfield, “New Principles 
For Corporate Law” (2005) 1 Hastings Business Law Journal 89; The Failure of Corporate Law (London: The 
University of Chicago Press 2006). For globally active multinational corporations, some commentators have 
referred to their footprint as a form of global citizenship, see eg Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten, Business 
Ethics: Managing Corporate Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Globalization (Oxford; OUP 2015); 
Judith Richter and John Borton, Holding Corporations Accountable: Corporate Conduct, International Codes, 
and Citizen Action (Zed Books 2001). 
20 The model used in M Jensen and W Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
to boost immediate term earnings and share price.21 Corporate short-termism can produce 
undesirable social consequences if the long-term wealth creation potential of companies are 
undermined.22  
In the global financial crisis 2007-9, shareholder pressure has been recognised to be 
influential upon a bank’s excessive risk-taking23  profile or misconduct in aggressive mis-
selling.24 Excessive risk-taking has ultimately culminated in stress or failure for certain banks 
while mis-selling has cost banks in severe regulatory fines.25 Banks and financial institutions’ 
narrow-minded concerns for shareholder wealth maximisation  are pitted against the social 
externalities of financial system disruptions and instability, consumer losses and loss of trust.  
                                                          
21 Corporate short termism, such as reducing employment expense and research and development investment 
in order to boost short-term earnings, obscures long-term thinking for the company and in due course could 
prove destructive for the long-term wealth creation role of the corporate economy see Corporate Values 
Strategy Group, Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment and 
Business Management (New York: Aspen Institute Business and Society Programs, 2009), 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/overcoming-short-termism-call-more-responsible-approach-
investment-business-management; C. Helms, M. Fox and R. Kenagy, ‘Corporate Short-Termism: Causes and 
Remedies’ (2012) 23 International and Comparative Company Law Review 45. Further, commentators  also 
find corporate short-termism to be related to greater indifference to stakeholder or corporate responsibility 
issues, and institutions lack motivation to address social and environmental harms that the company is 
perpetuating, see E. Duruigbo, ‘Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia’ (2011-12) 100 
Kentucky Law Journal 531; D. Millon, ‘Shareholder Social Responsibility’ (2012-13) 36 Seattle University Law 
Review 911; M. T. Moore and E. Walker-Arnott, ‘A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short Termism’ (2014) 41 
Journal of Law and Society 416. 
22 BIS, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making (Final Report, 23 July 2012). 
23 Andrea Beltratti and René M Stultz, ‘Why Did Some Banks Perform Better during the Credit Crisis? A Cross-
Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation’ (July 2009) NBER Working Paper No 15180 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1433502; Reint Gropp and Matthias Köhler, ‘Bank 
Owners or Bank Managers: Who is keen on Risk? Evidence from the Financial Crisis’ (January 2010) European 
Business School Research Paper No 10-02 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1555663,   Hanna Westman, ‘The Role of 
Ownership Structure and Regulatory Environment in Bank Corporate Governance’ (January 2010) 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435041; David H Erkens, Mingyi Hung and Pedro Matos, ‘Corporate Governance in 
the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide’ (2012) 18 Journal of Corporate 
Finance 389. 
24 Eg Ian Crowther and Ismail Erturk, ‘Post-Crisis Ban Regulation and Financialised Bank Business Models’ in 
Ismail Ertruk and Daniela Gabor (eds), The Routledge Companion to Banking Regulation and Reform (Oxford: 
Routledge 2016) at chapter 15. 
25 For example, in payment protection insurance, see FSA, ‘The Assessment and Redress of Payment Protection 
Insurance Complaints: Feedback on the further consultation in CP10/6 and final Handbook text’ (August 2010) 
PS10/12 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_12.pdf.  See Eilis Ferran, ‘Regulatory Lessons from the 
Payment Protection Insurance Mis-Selling Scandal in the UK’ (2012) European Business Organisation Law 
Review 248. 
Further, the protection of shareholders’ interests often drives companies to organise 
themselves in group structures in order to partition assets and responsibility for wrong-
doing,26 therefore leaving the victims of corporate externalities to very limited redress.27 In 
companies with controlling shareholders, we also observe that such shareholders have been 
able to marginalise minority shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests while extracting 
benefits from the company.28 The BHS scandal29 in the UK which formed a major part of the 
context for the Parliament’s Inquiry30 into the state of UK corporate governance is an 
example of excessive wealth transfer by the controlling shareholder at the expense of the 
company’s pension savers and pensioners. It is also well-known that shareholder value is 
boosted by cutting cost, usually at the expense of employee wages, working conditions or 
benefits.31 A case can be made for linking short-termist, ethically questionable and 
distributively unjust corporate behaviour to the apparent legitimating ideology of 
shareholder primacy. Indeed, the embrace of shareholder primacy has increasingly 
subverted the positive elements of a capitalist economic system now dominated by the 
economic activities carried out under the corporate form. 
                                                          
26 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning’ (2000) 44 European 
Economic Review 807. 
27 Often transnational corporations use thinly capitalised subsidiaries to undertake risky overseas operations 
so that the other corporate members of the group will be immune from the losses suffered by that subsidiary. 
The shifting of liability onto the parent company, a process called ‘lifting of the corporate veil’ is highly difficult 
to achieve in UK civil litigation, see Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433; 2 WLR 657; [1991] 1 All ER, 929; 
Newton-Sealy v AmorGroup Services Ltd and Others [2008] EWHC 233 (QB); Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd 
[2013] UKSC 34. There is no doctrine of ‘enterprise liability’ in the UK for corporate groups as a whole although 
some extent of such liability is recognised in the US and Germany.   See Meredith Dearborn, ‘Enterprise 
Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups’ (2009) 97 California Law Review 195. 
28 For example ‘ENRC ‘should have set off alarm bells’’, Financial Times (22 November 2013); ‘Essar Energy 
panel backs Ruia family’s take-private offer’, Financial Times (13 May 2014) on how controlling shareholders 
have prioritised their own interests and could blatantly carry out damaging decisions to minority shareholders 
and other stakeholders, such as misappropriation where ENRC was concerned, and squeeze-out and delisting 
in Essar’s case. See discussions in R. Barker and I. HY Chiu, ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders in Blockholder-
Controlled Companies - Critically Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime’ (2015) Capital Markets Law 
Journal 98. 
29 House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills Committees, BHS (2016) at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmworpen/54/54.pdf. 
30 Parliament Committee on Business, Innovation and Skills, Corporate Governance Inquiry (2016) at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/business-innovation-and-
skills/news-parliament-2015/corporate-governance-inquiry-launch-16-17/.  
31 Benedict Sheehy, “Corporations and Social Cost- The WalMart Case Study” (2004) 24 Journal of Law and 
Commerce 1. 
The embrace of shareholder primacy in company law has become systemically 
disempowering and marginalising for other productive capital in an economic system that is 
channelled through the corporate form, such as the intellectual and human capital of 
employees, reputational capital conferred by the corporation’s community, financial 
markets, media etc, loyalty capital committed by customers, users etc, firm-specific capital 
such as committed by dedicated suppliers and other forms of capital which could be 
tangible or intangible resources that the corporation draws upon for its business success.32 
This is because advantage has been taken of the entrenched imbalance in company law in 
favour of shareholders, and business and corporate practices have been developed along 
that line, instead of being characterised by restraint or efforts taken to ameliorate such 
imbalance. Where company share prices have been maintained at high levels over the last 
couple of decades, real wages have not increased by comparable levels.33 Where utilities 
have been privatised to provide more competition and choice for consumers, key negative 
headlines revolve around excessive executive pay and continued uncompetitive and high 
levels of utilities bills experienced by customers.34 
Even if the open-ended commitment of shareholder capital is valuable for the efficient 
organisation of the company, the law does not need to take the rather extreme position of 
only enrolling shareholder rights and powers in company law. This imbalance has allowed 
exploitative practices that benefit shareholders in terms of insulation from responsibility 
and favourable distribution, raising questions as to the ethics of such practices, which are 
now referred to as the ‘unacceptable face of capitalism’.35  
The embrace of shareholder primacy has also produced contrary ramifications to the raison 
d’etre of incorporation, which is to provide a long-termist outfit for the protection of 
productive activities sustained by investment capital,36 as discussed in Stout’s vision of the 
                                                          
32 Arturo Capasso, ‘Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Governance: The Role of Intangible Assets’ at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=610661; Robert Phillips, ‘Stakeholder Legitimacy’ (2003) 
13 Business Ethics Quarterly 25 on the stakeholders who remain unrecognised in company law.  
33 Greta Krippner, ‘Accumulation and the Profits of Finance’ and William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan, 
‘Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance’ in Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver and 
Karel Williams (eds), Financialization At Work: Key Tests and Commentary (Oxford: Routledge, 2008); Eckhard 
Hein, ‘Finance-dominated Capitalism and Redistribution of Income:A Kaleckian Perspective’ (2013) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2198919; Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, Adam Leaver and Karel Williams, 
Financialization and Strategy: Narrative and Numbers (Oxford: Routledge 2006) at chapter 4. 
34 Richard Greenbury, Report: Directors’ Remuneration (17 Jul 1995); ‘High Energy Bills’ in a special episode of 
the BBC’s Rip Off Britain (7 June 2016). 
35 Eg ‘Philip Green is not the only unacceptable face of capitalism’, Financial Times (28 July 2016). 
36 Margaret Blair, ‘The Neglected Benefits of the Corporate Form: Entity Status and the Separation of Asset 
Ownership From Control’ (2014) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=563307. 
corporation as ‘time machine’.37 Rather, the corporation is a place for extraction of short-
term value that can be carried out by those legitimately in power, i.e. executives in the form 
of excessive levels of pay38 and shareholders in the form of dividends or capital return or 
redemption, even if such wealth transfers exceed the company’s profits,39 or depletes the 
company’s long-term investment capital40 or cash buffer that can be useful to withstand 
times of stress.41 
We submit that the shareholder primacy-based modern corporation has developed many 
faces of flawed capitalism which has now put into doubt the social legitimacy of the modern 
corporation42 as well as the capitalist economic order.43   
                                                          
37 Lynn Stout, ‘The Corporation as Time Machine: Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and 
the Corporate Form’ (2015) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2556883. 
38 Eg William Forbes, ‘CEO Pay in FTSE 100: Pay Inequality, Board Size and Performance’ (2012) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2140204; Lisa Goh and Aditi Gupta, ‘Executive 
Compensation, Compensation Consultants, and Shopping for Opinion: Evidence from the UK’ (2010) at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577925. Also see High Pay Centre, Thinking High and 
Low: Exploring pay disparities in society at http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/thinking-high-and-low-exploring-
pay-disparities-in-society; ‘New High Pay Centre report: Executive pay continues to climb at expense of 
ordinary workers’ (2014) at http://highpaycentre.org/pubs/new-high-pay-centre-report-executive-pay-
continues-to-climb-at-expense-of-o. 
39  As in the case of BHS, see House of Commons Work and Pensions and Business, Innovation and Skills 
Committees, BHS (2016) at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmworpen/54/54.pdf. 
40 José-Miguel Gaspar, Massimo Massa, Pedro Matos, Rajdeep Patgiri and Zahid Rehman, ‘Can Buybacks be a 
Product of Shorter Shareholder Horizons?’ (2005) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=649482; Lee Pinkowitz, Rene M Stultz and Rohan 
Williamson, ‘Is There a U.S High Cash Holdings Puzzle after the Financial Crisis?’ (2012) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2064046; Nicoletta Batini and Joshua Felman, ‘Why are 
US Firms Hoarding Money?’ IMF, Country Report 11/202 (2011). 
41). Andrés Ramirez, ‘Risk and the Multinational Corporation Revisited: The Case of Natural Disasters and 
Corporate Cash Holdings’ (2011) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1772969; Tom W Bates, Kathryn M Kahle and 
Rene M Stultz, ‘Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?’ (2009) 64 Journal of Finance 
1985 on precautionary planning by managers. 
42. The insular nature of the shareholder-primacy based corporation ignores its social fabric which can lead to 
anti-social indifference which is yet legitimated under company law, see Ronald Blackwell and Thomas Kochan, 
‘Restoring Public Purpose to the Private Corporation’ (2013) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2214621; William W 
Bratton and Michael Wachter, ‘Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter’ 
(2010) 33 Seattle University Law Review 849; Brian M McCall, ‘The Corporation as Imperfect Society’ (2010) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621772. 
43 R. Edward Freeman, Kirsten Martin and Bidhan Parmar, ‘Stakeholder Capitalism’ (2007) 74 Journal of 
Business Ethics 303; M. McIntosh, Thinking the Twenty-First Century: Ideas for the New Political Economy 
The Need for Company Law Reform for Re-orientation towards a Stakeholder Conception 
of the Company   
It is time to recognise the negative distortions in company law that entail from shareholder 
primacy and embrace a case for reform. Indeed we argue that the foundational economic 
conception of the company as a ‘nexus of contracts’, 44 an internal web of transactional 
arrangements which is taken ‘off the market’, produces the ‘market failure’ of imbalance of 
negotiating power among the ‘nexus’. Such market failure is brought about by agency-based 
economics45 which narrowly focuses on shareholders and directors, and is echoed in 
company law. Hence, company law has itself produced distortions, distributing much of the 
internal political power within the company to the Board and shareholders in such a way 
that marginalises stakeholders’ positions within the firm, forcing stakeholders to maintain 
relationships with companies outside of the inner circle of corporate governance. We 
suggest that the distortions in corporate governance legitimated by shareholder primacy46 
lie at the root of many corporate malpractices and scandals, as many of these are only 
possible due to the apparently legitimate exploitation of power within the firm.  
These imbalances are unlikely to be corrected unless company law intervenes to redress 
them, therefore ideologically reforming itself. Thus, we disagree with critics who oppose 
reform implications from ‘stakeholder theory’ on the basis that excessively heavy lifting is 
required for such company law reform.47 We do not think that any legal reform should only 
be non-disruptive and minimal, especially since the level of social cost associated with 
corporate malpractices is rather significant. The failure of BHS in 2016 for example has 
entailed the loss of about 11,000 jobs, not to mention stranded suppliers and other service 
providers.48 We believe that insufficient attention has been given to operationalising such a 
stakeholder conception in company law, and critics who argue that stakeholder theory does 
not work have not engaged with exploring the design of frameworks to make it work. In this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield, 2015); Steffan Roth, ‘Free Economy! On 3628800 Alternatives of and to 
Capitalism’ (2015) 27 Journal of Inter-disciplinary Economics 1. 
44 See n10. 
45 M Jensen and W Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure” (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
46 Discussed above, and also see Joel Bakan, The Corporation - The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power 
(London: Penguin, 2003). 
47 John Hendry, ‘Missing the Target: Normative Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Governance Debate’ 
(2001) 11 Business Ethics Quarterly 159; Robert Phillips, R. Edward Freeman, and Andrew C. Wicks, ‘What 
Stakeholder Theory is Not’ (2003) 13 Business Ethics Quarterly 479. 
48 ‘BHS rescue bid fails with loss of 11,000 jobs’, The Guardian (2 June 2016). Although it may be argued that 
such ‘slack’ from a corporate fallout can be picked up by other competitive players in the market, that is 
speculative compared to the immediate social effects. 
respect, this article seeks to start the journey of considering how a stakeholder conception 
of the company can be operationalised in company law, in the Sections that follow.  
We do not agree that enrolling stakeholders, which are diverse groups would necessarily be 
disruptive for existing legal structures, create confusion for directors’ duties and the 
corporate objective, and cause the management of the company to descend into the realm 
of an impossible and dynamic chaos as directors quietly exercise their powers 
unaccountable to any of the warring factions of stakeholders.49 Legal reform necessitates 
adaptation to change and what we propose should not result in the disorderly doomsday 
picture suggested above. We also do not believe that relying on companies to inculcate 
stakeholder consciousness as a soft form of business or management ethics50 is sufficient,51 
as there are no consistent or fundamental motivations for companies to do so across the 
board, and whether stakeholders can bring their pressure to bear will depend largely on the 
political economy context relating to particular industry sectors.52 
In other words, we argue that reforms to company law to redress the imbalance of interests 
and power entailing from the ideological and legal embrace of shareholder primacy is 
necessary and possible. These are unlikely to arise out of self-governance and self-
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102 Journal of Business Ethics 77; James A Steib, ‘Assessing Freeman's Stakeholder Theory’ (2009) 87 Journal 
of Business Ethics 401. 
52 Some refer this issue to different varieties of capitalism calibrating different relational paradigms between 
the company and stakeholders based on political context, economic structures and social culture. See 
generally Peter A Hall and David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to the Varieties of Capitalism’ in Peter A Hall and 
David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001); and see critique in Dorothee 
Bohle and Béla Greskovits, ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Capitalism « tout court »’ (2009) 50 European Journal of 
Sociology 355. 
correction. We also believe that such reforms are key to addressing poor internal culture 
and ethics in companies, and their outward-facing behaviour.  
Before we turn to the key aspects of company law reform we propose, we seek to address 
arguments in principle that may not support such reforms. For example, one may argue that 
the issues that affect the social legitimacy of the company, such as corporate responsibility 
for externalities and imbalances in wealth distribution are matters for external regulation. 
This can be seen in the introduction of the Corporate Homicide and Manslaughter Act 2007 
which now has the potential to inflict criminal liability upon companies that cause injury or 
death to persons they owe a duty of care to. Further externalities relating to health and 
safety or the environment are better dealt with under precise regulatory obligations.53  
Distributive issues may be dealt with by reforms in employment law, tax law etc. Hence it 
can be argued that shareholder primacy does not support an imbalanced company law, but 
that it constitutes much of company law as other stakeholder related issues are more 
effectively dealt with elsewhere.54  
Next it can be argued that shareholders are to behave as ‘enlightened shareholders’ and 
‘stewards’ of savers’ capital invested in companies.55 Hence, shareholder primacy is more 
benign than is suggested above, and is able to accommodate holistic notions of corporate 
performance for the long-term. The due consideration of stakeholder interests is necessary 
to ensure the company’s long-term success, and so there is no need to take the view that 
pursuing shareholder primacy necessarily diverges from stakeholder interests.56  
Further, it may be argued that the internal culture and ethics of a company is not a matter 
that can be addressed by company law. Company law can only provide a framework for the 
distribution of power in decision-making in the company, but the leadership of the company, 
group/sub-group leadership within a company, its norms, habits and people overall make up 
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56 Eg see David Wheeler and Maria Silanpaa, “Including the Stakeholders: The Business Case” (1998) 31(2) Long 
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the unique culture of a company which sustains its business enterprise and its social 
footprint.57 One cannot be overly prescriptive about such internal organisational matters. 
We address the above in turn. 
First, although external regulation may address the issues of distribution of liabilities and 
outcomes, this supposes that state-based agencies are best placed to act in the 
representative interests of certain stakeholders. In some cases, we agree this is the case, 
such as in some aspects of environmental regulation where the environment cannot have a 
‘voice’ and the coherent public interest in environmental protection makes it both effective 
and efficient58 for state-based agencies to regulate certain corporate conduct and impose 
regulatory liability. It has also been recognised that an ever-growing landscape of economic 
life under capitalist and free market principles often necessitates a concomitant growth in 
‘regulatory capitalism’. Levi-Faur argues that the economic society rests on a bedrock of 
regulation, a phenomenon known as ‘regulatory capitalism’.59 Regulatory capitalism refers 
to the existence of governance frameworks that shape economic functioning and protect 
certain political or social values, representing a landscape where economic functions and 
needs are facilitated, and where distributive or social goals are also pursued. Braithwaite60 
supports this by arguing that it is a myth that the laissez-faire nature of markets has been 
allowed to flourish as such in the ideology of neo-liberalism and deregulation. In fact, he 
argues that the public character of governance continues to exist extensively and has 
evolved into a form of regulatory capitalism. The latter half of the 20th century has seen the 
rise in the administrative state in western economies such as the US and UK (developments 
in the welfare and administrative state in the UK arguably having proliferated under the 
Labour government elected in 1945),61 testimony to the necessity of regulatory capitalism. 
Indeed Omarova et al call for increased corporate regulation to be seen as necessary and 
socially acceptable to address many of the corporate ills we see today.62 
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However, we do not think that all stakeholder interests can or should be subject to 
protection only by way of regulatory standards and enforcement. Some stakeholder 
interests may be at such a scale that does not amount to a public interest concern,63 and 
further we cannot assume that regulatory agencies always act as ‘protectors’ of the public 
or groups of the public. They may be subject to failings such as capture,64 or pursue their 
own agendas that do not necessarily dovetail with certain stakeholder needs.65 There is no 
reason why stakeholders should not be provided with protection that can be actionable in 
private enforcement within company law.  
We argue that company law, which already deals extensively with the shareholders (general 
meeting) – directors (the Board) relationship, is well-placed to provide frameworks for 
stakeholder relations with the company too. Many stakeholders make firm-specific 
commitments that are long-termist and ongoing,66 and would benefit from the 
establishment of principles for a relational framework within and not just with the company. 
The emphasis on developing only shareholders’ procedural rights, powers and justice is not 
justifiable. Further, as company law inherently supports the checking and balancing of 
power, by subjecting directors to monitoring and accountability, it is an anomaly not to 
subject shareholders’ rights and powers to more controls and balance.67 Hence, reforms in 
company law that cater for a wider stakeholder conception could ensure that the interests 
of any one powerful group may be effectively balanced. We argue in support of such 
reforms to enhance stakeholders’ positions and power in a company, as we believe these 
will relate ultimately to the substantive outcomes of fairer distribution of responsibility and 
wealth, mitigation of externalities and improved corporate practices and ethics. 
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Next, the abstract ‘enlightened’ shareholder does not reflect the reality of many 
shareholder groups,68 and it is almost facetious to suggest that the abstract notion 
encompasses the real needs of stakeholder voice. Besides, the Financial Reporting Council 
(which administers the Stewardship Code for institutional shareholders who have signed up 
to it) report cosmetic levels of ‘stewardship’ behaviour that need to be improved.69 
Finally, company law has a role in the internal ordering of corporate relations, and is 
especially relevant as the imbalances that prevail in our current ideology and system of 
corporate governance have already given rise to dysfunctional corporate cultures.70 Where 
corporate culture has been recognised to be dysfunctional and not capable of self-
correction, regulatory interventions have taken place in the form of mandatory securities71 
or financial regulation72 in order address sub-optimalities in internal organisation or 
responsibility within the company.  
We also argue that reforms in company law in support of a stakeholder conception should 
not merely be limited to the publicly listed company. The publicly listed company may be 
perceived to have a wider social footprint. We note recent initiatives that are moving 
towards compelling the publicly listed company to behave in a more holistic manner within 
the confines of a shareholder primacy framework. For example, corporate transparency 
must include stakeholder relations and impact issues.73 Moreover, private companies are 
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not exactly regarded as being in a realm of complete self-governance just because they do 
not interface with public securities markets. We observe range of corporate regulation that 
now targets undesirable and unethical corporate behaviour74 across the board. Indeed, in 
private companies, the shareholder primacy ethos can be taken to logical extremes due to 
the lack of scrutiny by markets and regulators and it seems that policy-makers have become 
concerned about the abuses emanating from such unchecked behaviour. For example, 
private equity buy-out funds may take a company from public to private in the name of 
improving the company’s performance and prospects.75 However what happens often in the 
opacity of a private company context is significant extractive behaviour by buy-out funds 
coupled with sophisticated financial engineering that produces skewed distribution in 
favour of the buy-out fund owners.76 These taken-private companies may remain large, 
employ significant numbers of people and have a remarkable social footprint. To allow the 
extremes of shareholder primacy-based behaviour in these large private companies would 
result in severe imbalances and injustice to stakeholders. Thus, European legislation has 
acted to prevent buy-out funds from asset stripping their portfolio companies within the 
short term.77  Hence, we believe that the ideological and legal reform of the shareholder 
primacy tenet in company law is timely and applicable for all companies.  
As the social appetite for transforming capitalism grows,78 company law reform is crucial as 
it addresses the predominant modern engine for economic activities, the company, and can 
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change corporate practices and ethics, therefore directly affecting the shape of the evolving 
capitalist order that we have today.79 We propose a blueprint for company law reform 
consisting of certain key elements in the Sections below, but we recognise that judicial 
interpretation is needed to flesh out the development and understanding of the nature of 
and standards for any new obligations introduced. Further there may be detail and ancillary 
matters that need adjustment which cannot be fully canvassed within the article space. Our 
blueprint consists of the following key aspects: Section B discusses the introduction of 
company covenants with stakeholders, supported by corporate transparency. We then 
discuss the most significant adjustments in company law that should be made pursuant to 
the new stakeholder conception of company law namely, a new director’s duty, 
enforcement mechanisms against directors and the company, and the scope of shareholder 
powers as currently provided under company law. These are discussed in Sections B and C. 
Section D concludes. 
B. Covenants with Company Stakeholders 
We propose that it should be a best practice for companies to enter into stakeholder 
covenants with key stakeholders, flanked by an appropriate directors’ duty to comply with 
such covenants if established. It may be queried why this article proposes the use of 
stakeholder covenants as the main framework for a stakeholder conception of the company, 
instead of looking to Board representation for stakeholders?  
Stakeholder covenants provide a range of options for companies and their stakeholders to 
structure their relationships, and Board representation could be one of them. Hence we 
think treating stakeholderism in companies as equivalent to Board representation is too 
narrow and in some cases inappropriate. For example the lack of financial qualifications on 
the Co-operative Bank board which had good stakeholder representation nevertheless 
contributed to its dire capital situation in 2013.80 Further, Board representation does not 
sufficiently address stakeholder interests, as it does not address the prevailing power matrix 
of the general meeting and Board in companies. One of the ramifications of adopting a 
stakeholder conception of the company would be the recalibration of the balance of powers 
in the company, and it is argued that the adoption of stakeholder covenants, as argued in 
this paper, provides a superior and more thorough framework. 
First, stakeholder covenants should cover how the company engages with identified groups 
of stakeholders on an enduring basis. Stakeholder covenants can to an extent be modelled 
upon the company’s constitution, which is a covenant with shareholders. Companies bind 
themselves to shareholders as a collective body via the company’s constitution, which is a 
contractual document in nature setting out the mutual expectations and responsibilities of 
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the company and the general meeting as a whole.81 This document embodies shareholders’ 
common rights in the general meeting and vis a vis the company, and does not represent 
any one or group of shareholder interests. On a similar basis, stakeholder covenants can be 
forged with clearly identified groups of stakeholders with common characteristics, dealing 
with their common interests and responsibilities as a group, leaving matters of individual 
relevance to contracts with the company beyond the realm of company law. In this respect 
the company’s constitution, which is essentially shareholders’ covenant with the company, 
would not be the exclusive ‘covenantal’ relationship that the company forges. 
We encourage companies to forge stakeholder covenants with their perceived key 
stakeholders but we are of the view that these covenants should be pursued as a matter of 
best practice and not as a matter for mandatory law for now. This is because making it 
mandatory for companies to forge stakeholder covenants will necessarily entail questions as 
to who the stakeholders are, what the covenants must contain and what mandatory 
procedures are to be provided, prescriptive detail that may not necessarily be best 
legislated at the moment. Nevertheless, we set out below in this article a range of guidance 
to answer the above questions, such guidance having been derived in part from voluntary 
developments so far. Mandatory law in this area can be developed at a more mature stage 
of company-stakeholder relational development where certain common standards or 
principles are found to be desirable across the board or where certain common ‘bargaining’ 
failures need to be addressed.  
Identifying Key Stakeholders 
In identifying their relevant key stakeholders for the purposes of forging stakeholder 
covenants, companies are able to avail themselves of different approaches suggested by 
stakeholder theorists.  Stakeholder theorists have offered various approaches to classifying 
stakeholders, such as Freeman’s82 initial approach of treating ‘owners, managers, local 
community, employees, suppliers and customers’ as key stakeholders. Further, one can 
refer to Donaldson and Preston’s approach of identifying whether stakeholders are 
important for normative, instrumental or descriptive reasons,83 or Tao and Sirgy’s 
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classification of ‘internal’, ‘external’ and ‘distal’ stakeholders all of which may require 
different levels of engagement.84  
Mandatory prescriptions would not be able to capture the richness and variety of 
approaches to stakeholder salience that comprises of (a) the company’s perspective of 
relevance in terms of its strategy, reputation and other priorities; and (b) ground-up 
perspectives from stakeholder groups in terms of their perceived salience to the company 
concerned. Further, voluntary organisations85 that already have established credibility in 
offering frameworks and standards for corporate responsibility may be able to help 
companies establish stakeholder identification frameworks and engagement processes. 
Companies can also engage consultants to help them establish tailor-made frameworks and 
processes.  
Companies should identify and forge stakeholder covenants with their key stakeholders, and 
to make disclosure of the rationale for establishing such covenants, the number and types 
of covenants established and their contents, including updates to such covenants on a 
yearly basis. This can be worked into the yearly reporting obligations for all companies alike, 
and similar exemptions for small companies in the Companies Act 2006 can continue to 
apply if such companies have minimal stakeholder footprint. Transparency provides an 
avenue of public accountability for companies in their stakeholder relations, and such 
transparency, which is not only relevant to securities markets, facilitates a form of social 
scrutiny that can give rise to useful ‘feedback’ to companies and stakeholder groups alike in 
developing covenantal relations.86 
The disadvantages of introducing mandatory lists or criteria for companies to identify their 
stakeholders would be that lists are often under or over-inclusive and ‘one-size-fits-all’ for 
any company in question. Further mandatory criteria may only introduce incentives for 
companies to restructure their stakeholder relations in order not to be captured within the 
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criteria, introducing a cat-and-mouse game detracting from spirited compliance with 
mandatory obligations. For example, if mandatory criteria for attaining the status of a 
company stakeholder is a sufficiently long-term of contractual engagement such as in supply 
relationships or employment relationships, companies may introduce tender tournaments 
for supply contracts in order to avoid labelling any supplier as a stakeholder, or introduce 
flexible and non-committal employment arrangements that may not be in employees’ 
interests.  
However, we are mindful that companies should especially take into account stakeholders 
who have made ‘firm-specific commitments’87 to the company as commentators have 
identified them as a group whose fortunes are highly vulnerable to the company’s.  Such 
stakeholders often commit themselves to meet the company’s needs or in some way 
contribute to the company’s productive processes in such a way as to become 
interdependent with the company and therefore vulnerable to the company’s fortunes. 
Dedicated or long-term suppliers of particular goods or services may be an example. Long-
term creditors are also an example of this group but they are already slightly better 
protected in company law.88 Long-term employees of the company are a candidate for this 
group too and another example in the social media context could be the loyal users of the 
social media network.  
It may be argued that if stakeholder covenants are a best practice and not as a mandatory 
obligation, companies would not likely take the initiative to develop stakeholder covenants. 
This lack of motivation may be due to the cost incurred as first movers in developing such 
covenants which can then be copied and adopted by other companies. We acknowledge 
that there may be uptake problems, but the mandatory transparency imposed on 
companies (not just quoted companies, as suggested earlier) to report on existence (or 
otherwise) of stakeholder covenants and their contents could create some pressure for 
companies to justify to their stakeholders any perceived indifference to this issue. Further, 
companies could also be motivated to take leadership in this area if they perceive a business 
case or reputational enhancement incentives. Hence, we argue at this stage that we should 
refrain from mandatorising stakeholder covenants in order to give some time to observe the 
responses from business practice.   
Directors’ Duty 
Next we recommend that a director’s duty can be introduced to support company-
stakeholder covenants by requiring directors to ensure that the covenants are complied 
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with if established, similar to the existing directors’ duty to adhere to the company’s 
constitution.89 
One question that may arise is how such a duty is to be enforced. In the current scheme of 
things, shareholders individually or collectively would be able to enforce the company’s 
constitution inter se or against the company.90 Further, the company can take enforcement 
action against a director who is responsible for not complying with the company’s 
constitution. This is however subject to the general meeting’s approval of the non-
adherence,91 or majority vote at the general meeting by way of ratification.92 A minority 
shareholder could in principle mount a derivation action against a director’s breach of duty 
in non-adherence to the constitution, if conditions in the Companies Act are met.93 These 
actions available to redress breaches of the company’s constitution are however unsuitable 
for enforcement of stakeholder covenants. Shareholders are not the appropriate 
constituents to enforce stakeholder covenants or a breach of director’s duty in non-
adherence to such a covenant, as they may be disinterested or indeed conflicted from doing 
so. We argue in Section C that in tandem with developing a stakeholder conception in 
company law, adjustments would have to be made in the current scheme of things so that 
enforcement rights are distributed more widely where relevant, and shareholders’ exclusive 
powers in certain respects would have to be adjusted. Hence, we envisage that stakeholders 
as a group should have standing to enforce the covenants against the company and 
directors. Section C will elaborate on this. 
Contents of Stakeholder Covenants 
We envisage that stakeholder covenants can contain principles, desired standards and 
practices on the part of the company, engagement frameworks with the stakeholder group, 
standards and conduct expected on the part of the stakeholder group, procedural provisions 
that guide dialogue and decision-making, information disclosure and transparency, and 
overall, mutual expectations and responsibilities.  
The stakeholder covenant should however not be the appropriate location for specific 
contractual rights or obligations that are derived from stakeholders’ commercial 
relationships, if any, with the company. Further, stakeholder covenants should not be used 
as a means to compel the divulgence of confidential or commercially sensitive information. 
                                                          
89 S171(a), Companies Act 2006. 
90 Eg Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70. 
91 MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13. 
92 Section 239, Companies Act 2006. 
93 S260-263. 
For example, a stakeholder covenant with suppliers should not be the platform for suppliers 
to compare commercial terms and conditions. 
In forging stakeholder covenants, companies and their relevant stakeholder groups can 
consult the vast body of soft law in standards and best practices so as to establish a 
desirable set of conduct standards that is meaningful for both parties. At a high level, the 
UN Global Compact provides a template for internationally optimal standards of conduct of 
business in relation to human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption.94 In 
relation to human rights, the UN Guiding Principles95 flesh out further that companies 
should respect human rights by instituting policy and operational commitment, including 
procedural mechanisms and systems to engage with identifying and verifying human rights 
abuses and to install remediation mechanisms to make redress to the relevant parties. For 
example, if a company enters into a stakeholder covenant with a local community 
representative group in the area that it is operating, such a covenant could contain 
standards of conduct consistent with the international corporate responsibility standards 
under the Global Compact and UN Guiding Principles. Such international standards provide 
a template to facilitate consensus in company-stakeholder negotiations. Further, interested 
stakeholder groups may also be able to hold companies to international standards on 
particular issues such as anti-corruption96 or anti-tax-evasion,97 giving such international 
soft law a ‘harder’ status through the mechanism of private legalisation through stakeholder 
covenants. 
International guidelines and soft law specific to particular sectors may also be helpful for 
groups of stakeholders relevant to certain sectors. For example in activities where 
conservation interests are important such as in agriculture, fisheries, farming industries, 
stakeholders interested in conservation or the prevention of externalities could forge 
covenants with their respective companies based on industry-specific standards introduced 
such as by the OECD.98 In the apparel industry where the key issues may concern unequal 
labour relations who have weak bargaining power or the use of child labour, stakeholders 
such as labour representation groups could draw from the Cleanclothes.org apparel industry 
code of conduct to hold companies to specific standards such as commitment to 
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maintaining decent working conditions and fair contractual terms, engagement with 
collective bargaining and refraining from using child labour.99 
Next, an important aspect in stakeholder covenants should relate to stakeholder 
engagement frameworks that enrol stakeholders’ voice and feedback. In this area, a number 
of organisations have established frameworks for stakeholder engagement which can be 
studied and adopted. For example, Accountability.org has developed a standard for 
stakeholder engagement that requires companies to plan for engagement, prepare, 
implement and review such engagement.100 Planning includes mapping the relevant 
stakeholders using clear criteria and indicators, determining the engagement level and 
boundaries of disclosure, drawing up a plan and process of engagement. Preparing to 
engage includes mobilising resources and building capacity to engage, and preparing for the 
risks of such engagement. Implementation involves inviting the relevant stakeholders 
through the processes for engagement, including briefing stakeholders and giving them a 
voice through various possible channels. Stakeholder input and feedback should then be 
analysed to feed into an action plan that should have identifiable outputs and clearly 
communicated to stakeholders. The action plan should be implemented and the company 
should then review the implementation, develop follow-up to the plan and regularly 
communicate the results to stakeholders. The Accountability framework is by far one of the 
most comprehensive templates. Other frameworks can be found in the ISO’s stakeholder 
engagement standard,101 which also provides (a) a clear process for circumstances of 
engagement such as the commencement of a new project, (d) stakeholder identification, (c) 
equal access to information, (d) timely consultation and (e) the due study of stakeholder 
feedback in corporate decision-making. For sector-specific initiatives, the Equator principles 
instituted by banks ensure that borrowers of project finance manage their environmental 
and social impact risks by adequate stakeholder engagement,102 including setting up 
informed engagement and consultation processes with affected stakeholders and a 
grievance mechanism to address their complaints. 
Next, we are of the view that stakeholder covenants can go several steps further than just 
enrolling stakeholder engagement and voice. Stakeholder covenants can also set out how 
stakeholders are to be empowered to be part of corporate decision-making processes. This 
can be efficient for companies whose operations are deeply embedded within stakeholder 
communities so that likely problems can be resolved with greater effectiveness and 
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amicability. For example, where a company is undertaking a major project that affects 
community, conservation and other interests, a structure can be set up for continuous 
engagement throughout the duration of the project, such as having stakeholder 
representatives as observers at risk committee meetings on the Board.  
In longer-term and open-ended types of stakeholder relationships such as the employment 
relationship, there may be a case for stakeholder representation on the Board or in a 
relevant committee of the Board, such as in nomination, remuneration or risk committees, 
where long-term issues such as Board succession, executive pay and pay policy and the 
management of business risks could benefit from stakeholder representation and input. The 
German co-determination model is a reflection of such ethos, although it has been criticised 
in terms of supervisory Board inefficiencies and the representation of partisan interests.103 
This model can nevertheless provide learning experience in studying reform, and we can 
consider sharpening this model by more precisely enrolling employee representation in 
matters that they have a material stake in, such as in firm-wide remuneration policy or 
pensions policy, rather than set quotas in the supervisory board. In light of the BHS 
scandal,104 it is also queried whether there may be a case for the ad hoc enrolment of 
stakeholders in decision-making on Boards where such decisions affect them significantly. 
The depletion of BHS’ pension pot in favour of massive dividends out of thin profitability is 
an instance of legal but excessive transfers of wealth that adversely affected a wide range of 
stakeholders. Such could only be possible as the decision-makers for wealth allocation (the 
Board and shareholders) exclude the key stakeholders in this issue - the employees, 
pensioners and the Pensions Regulator. 
Stakeholder covenants should also provide for information exchange mechanisms, which 
include relevant information disclosure inter se subject to the needs of confidentiality and 
commercial sensitivity. In terms of what stakeholders expect to be disclosed from 
companies, this is an area that is well-developed under the leadership of a number of 
voluntary organisations such as the Global Reporting Initiative and Accountability.org. The 
GRI reporting standards105 have become a market leader, providing a standard template of 
non-financial reporting in seven areas of company operations that have responsibility 
implications, i.e. Economic, Labour, Human Capital, Environmental, Social and Product 
Responsibility.  The GRI template provides for how non-financial reporting can be carried 
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out with regard to policies, conduct, operations and impact. The GRI also provides sector-
specific reporting templates for the relevant social responsibility concerns. Further, we are 
also of the view that reciprocal disclosure obligations should be required of stakeholders vis 
a vis the company, such as stakeholders’ declaration of any conflicts of interests. We believe 
that the mutual transparency is important so that stakeholder engagement is carried out in 
a way as objectively as possible in order to constructively feed into company decision-
making.106. 
Finally, we see stakeholder covenants as including mutual rights, responsibilities and 
accountability provisions, such as principles of integrity in communications, fair dealing, 
disclosure of conflicts of interest, due accountability, mutual feedback, complaints-handling 
and so on. They can also include Freeman’s principles107 of stakeholderism, such as rules 
regarding entry and exit108 with respect to the relational paradigm with the company, and 
the distribution of the cost of engagement. 
Legal Status of Stakeholders’ Covenants 
In terms of the legal stature of the stakeholder covenant, we propose to put it on the same 
footing as the company’s constitution. This means that where stakeholder covenants are 
established, they should be treated as contractual documents binding the company and its 
group of stakeholders inter se. This is consistent with the stakeholder conception of the 
company where stakeholders should not be seen as inferior to shareholders, and indeed 
shareholders are only part of the total ‘team’109 of stakeholders who contribute to the 
company’s wealth creation processes as a whole. A question may arise as to whether 
multiple constitutional obligations for the company will result in impossibility in giving effect 
to any constitutional document, as there may be conflicting obligations. 
We do not see stakeholder covenants as posing particularly insurmountable and conflicting 
multiple obligations. Directors and indeed the company are accountable to multiple 
constituents all the time, including sectoral regulators, the stock exchange, different classes 
of shareholders. It is part and parcel of directors’ responsibilities to chart a coherent course 
for companies, respecting all relevant obligations and acting in the best interests of the 
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company as a whole. Further, a recent development in relation to premium-listed 
companies on the London Stock Exchange also raises the prospect of multiple forms of 
constitutional governance for companies consistent with what is proposed in this article. In 
premium-listed companies with controlling shareholders, such companies are mandated to 
enter into relationship agreements with their controlling shareholders to limit the latter’s 
control and possible abuse of power in order to protect minority shareholders’ interests.110 
It has been suggested111 that the legal status of such agreements may be akin to a 
constitutional one, although the Listing Rules has designed different enforcement 
mechanisms for the relationship agreement. We consider it plausible that company 
constitutional law can be extended to protect a wider range of relational expectations and 
set out mutual responsibilities. Further, it is disproportionate to argue that challenges in 
managing multiple relational paradigms should be sufficient to prevent giving stakeholders a 
position in company law entirely. Such challenges can be managed by reforms in company 
law (discussed herein) and development in directors’ management frameworks, both of 
which are possible. 
We also note that the idea of stakeholder covenants is not entirely new as there are nascent 
signs of development in other jurisdictions that see this device as useful in securing 
companies’ commitment to social responsibility obligations. SHIFT in particular reports that 
the Netherlands government is brokering discussions and engagement between companies 
and stakeholders to forge ‘sectoral covenants’ that contain common standards and 
principles for respecting business and human rights relevant to particular sectors.112  
C. Adjustments in Company Law 
The operationalisation of a stakeholder conception in company law necessitates an 
adjustment in the balance of powers in company law. We argue that in principle, such 
adjustments have to be made in two areas: shareholders’ enforcement rights and 
shareholders’ exclusive powers over certain aspects of company decision-making.113 
Many of the enforcement rights in company law belong to shareholders, or liquidators at 
the company’s demise. Shareholder enforcement rights include enforcement of the 
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company’s constitution against the company (section 33 of the Companies Act 2006), the 
right to take derivative actions (sections 260-263), right to petition against unfairly 
prejudicial treatment (section 994) and the enforcement of other shareholder rights such as 
rights relating to general meetings114 and other rights such as pre-emption rights.115 
Although section 172 of the Companies Act requires directors to promote the long-term 
success of the company as a whole taking into account stakeholders’ interests, it is clear 
that stakeholders do not have enforcement rights against directors if they are of the view 
that their interests are inadequately taken into account of. The duty remains actionable by 
the company, or by shareholders in derivative action. This is why a number of 
commentators are of the view that this director’s duty does not deviate from shareholder 
primacy and would unlikely give effect to a stakeholder conception of company law.116 
Enforcement of Covenant 
In giving effect to our proposed stakeholder conception in company law via the mechanism 
of stakeholder covenants, we propose that such covenants if established should be 
accompanied by private rights of enforcement. This includes a right for the relevant group 
of stakeholders to enforce the covenant directly against the company and enforcement 
against breaches of the directors’ duty we discussed above. First, we propose that a 
provision similar to section 33 of the Companies Act 2006 be drafted to provide for the 
covenantal effect between stakeholders as a group and the company. Should such 
covenants like the company’s constitution, also bind members inter se?117 We think there is 
no reason to exclude that effect as stakeholders can agree to the standards of conduct and 
accountability inter se. For example, a company could have a stakeholder covenant with its 
group of long-term service suppliers which includes a number of different service providers. 
The covenant should set out the paradigm and frameworks for the relations between the 
company and stakeholder group as a whole, but such a covenant may also set out 
expectations and responsibility within the stakeholder group inter se, such as fair dealing.  
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Company law should set out the scheme of covenant enforcement, akin to enforcement of 
the company’s constitution by shareholders. Such an enforcement scheme, based on 
expressly agreed standards of conduct, expectations and responsibilities by clearly identified 
stakeholder groups, is less likely susceptible to critique that stakeholder litigation is open-
ended, unpredictable and often frivolous or vexatious.118 Further, company constitutional 
enforcement has little room to import of implied terms, thus narrowing down the scope of 
unpredictable claims or assertions in stakeholder litigation against the company.119 
Derivative Action against Directors? 
Further, the director’s duty to adhere to stakeholder covenants if established allows a 
company to sue an errant or deviant director who is responsible for bringing about the 
breach of the covenant. Such deviation may be regarded as not in the best interests of the 
company, and could be actionable as a matter of general fiduciary loyalty, or under an 
expanded amendment to s171(a) of the Companies Act which currently makes it a director’s 
duty not to deviate from the company’s constitution. One question that arises is whether 
the affected stakeholder group should be able to sue the director directly as well, such as 
under a derivative action where there may be similar circumstances such as those that give 
rise to the shareholder’s derivative claim.  
We think it not implausible to expand the shareholders’ statutory derivative action to allow 
stakeholders to sue in a similar capacity where a breach of a stakeholder covenant has 
occurred. In principle, the primary cause of action for affected stakeholders is the 
enforcement of the stakeholder covenant against the company. However if covenantal 
enforcement is futile, such as where a company has become insolvent, stakeholders may 
bring a relevant action in director’s breach of duty in order to obtain redress.120 Thus, we 
think the statutory derivative action could be expanded to accommodate stakeholders’ suits 
against errant directors where a breach of a stakeholder covenant can be established. This is 
an action we see as contained and proportionate in scope. 
One question that may arise is that the above enforcement mechanisms do not address the 
situation where a group of stakeholders wish to claim redress against the company for 
failing to enter into a covenant with them. Legal redress may not be the appropriate realm 
to pursue this problem.  Interested groups may look into other forms of engagement 
including media discussions to bring the matter to the company’s attention. However it may 
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be argued that there is a need to seek directors’ accountability for their decisions to exclude 
particular groups, and there would be a lacuna for such accountability if there were no legal 
actions that can be mounted.  
The general principle for directors’ discretion to enter into covenants with certain 
stakeholder groups or otherwise is one that has to be exercised in the best interests of the 
company. We think that an exclusion of a relevant stakeholder group could in theory be 
questioned in relation to this directors’ duty. The enforcement mechanism we propose will 
be discussed below in relation to a wider perspective on adjustments of shareholders’ and 
Boards’ powers in company law.  
We turn now to a more fundamental implication of the stakeholder conception of company 
law, that is, whether existing frameworks for exclusive shareholder powers in company law 
can continue to be sustained. We argue that a stakeholder conception in company law 
compels us to revisit areas of exclusive shareholder powers and to consider how these may 
be more appropriately balanced. 
Adjustment of Exclusive Shareholder Powers 
At the moment shareholders enjoy key exclusive decision-making powers under the 
Companies Act 2006 such as in relation to the removal of directors,121 capital structure 
decisions such as reduction of capital122 or share buybacks,123 ratification decisions involving 
directors’ breach of duties,124 approval for transactions with directors,125 and their pay 
packages,126 and whether or not to accept a takeover offeror’s bid.127 It may be argued that 
the framework of shareholder rights and powers is what makes companies in the UK 
attractive to investors both at home and abroad, and thus, there would be significant 
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repercussions if company law shifted towards curtailing shareholder powers.128 We argue 
however that our proposal is one of rebalancing powers so that some aspects of 
shareholders’ exclusive powers may be shared in light of a stakeholder conception, and so 
there should not be an exaggerated impression of shareholder marginalisation. Further, as 
these proposals are meant to strengthen the company as a whole for the long term, 
shareholders should see such reform as having overall beneficial value, and should not rely 
on short-termist transfer of wealth from other shareholders or stakeholders as a means of 
return on investment.  
We are of the view that under a stakeholder conception of company law, certain exclusive 
shareholder powers need to be adjusted to reflect the new matrix that is more inclusive and 
holistic. For example, we do not think that shareholders’ exclusive decision-making power in 
appointing and removing directors should remain if the Board consists of directors fielded 
for stakeholder representation purposes, according to the relevant stakeholder covenant. If 
shareholders could decide on whether to appoint a candidate nominated by a stakeholder 
group under its covenant or to remove him/her, that has the potential to undermine the 
legal status and spirit of stakeholder covenants. This does not mean that shareholders lose 
the right to propose a removal altogether, and we will shortly address the implications of 
such rebalancing, which involve both the Board and stakeholder groups playing a more 
prominent role. 
Another example: in terms of ratifying directors’ breaches of duties, we are of the view that 
such breaches of duty should not merely be ratified by an ordinary resolution in 
shareholders’ general meeting. There may be stakeholder implications for such breaches of 
duty, such as negative externalities. Again, we suggest an alternative framework below for 
ratification below that represents a more balanced calibration of powers in the company.  
In terms of shareholders’ exclusive powers in capital, pay and takeover decisions, we are of 
the view that adjustments need to be made. In capital structuring decisions, existing 
shareholders stand most to gain in a reduction of capital or buyback of shares, but there are, 
as pointed out in Section A, implications for the long-term investment of the company and 
the company’s ability to withstand cash flow stresses. Hence, shareholders are not the 
optimal group in fact to decide as they cannot be objective in such decisions. In executive 
pay decisions, although shareholders have shown some interest in restraining rewards for 
failures,129 they are not consistently active in scrutiny,130 and have been complicit in 
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awarding increasingly eye-watering amounts of executive pay as long as their returns on 
capital objectives are met.131 Shareholders do not scrutinise executive pay in terms of 
whether transfers of wealth to executives is proportionate or in the interests of the 
company as a whole. The concerns of pay disparity and transfers of wealth are not taken 
care of in shareholder scrutiny. Finally in takeover situations, shareholders are often 
tempted to sell out at an attractive premium,132 and it is only in rare cases that they are 
persuaded to hold on for the long-term interests of the company.133 Takeover decisions 
often affect stakeholders acutely, such as the fate of employees, suppliers and the local 
community in which the company operates, but they have no voice in the matter at all, a 
bizarre imbalance that may not be justified when the UK position is compared to other 
jurisdictions.134 In all of the above situations, we offer alternatives that are consistent with 
our proposed framework for recalibration of powers in the company. 
We acknowledge that in all of the above cases, exclusive shareholder power in decision-
making may be seen as a ‘check and balance’ against managerial power. However, exclusive 
shareholder power also brings about skewed consequences and marginalisation of 
legitimate voices and concerns, such as the selling out of the long-term prospects of 
nationally significant enterprises (such as the Cadbury takeover case).135 Nevertheless, 
making all the above decisions subject to a consensus-based framework for both 
shareholders and stakeholders may be inefficient, as partisan interests that cannot easily be 
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reconciled results in deadlocks in company decision-making. 136 Furthermore, introducing 
such consensus-based frameworks marginalises directors, whose professional judgment and 
decision-making powers should be more constructively utilised subject to appropriate 
constraints for the agency-based concerns. 
Hence, in this recalibration of the power matrix of the company, it is not just about 
adjustment of shareholder powers, but about how power is distributed and exercised in 
ways that are both efficient and holistic. In so doing, we must not forget the Board, and we 
argue that there is a need to consider enhancing Board responsibilities and powers to 
mediate the new inclusive stakeholder framework, but also to act as an efficient decision-
maker supported by robust accountability and enforcement mechanisms.137 
Implications for Power Matrix in Company Law as a Whole 
(a) Enhanced Board Leadership Supported by Increased Accountability 
First, we see it as inevitable that some of the decisions exclusively reserved to shareholders 
discussed above would need leadership from the Board in a pluralistic relational paradigm 
including stakeholders. This means that the Board would become the primary organ to 
make decisions in many matters, but we advocate an expansion to the Board’s duty to 
consult and to be accountable in order to provide balance to enhanced powers. 
For example, in replacing shareholders’ powers to exclusively appoint or remove Board 
members, there is a case for arguing that both shareholders and stakeholders should have 
rights of nomination. Stakeholders’ rights of nomination should be set out within the terms 
of the relevant stakeholder covenant.  
As these rights become dispersed among different groups, the need for mediation arises in 
the needs of efficiency. We argue that the approval of Board members should be vested in 
the nomination committee of the Board, which must provide a reasoned statement of 
satisfaction that the appointed candidate’s profile would serve the best interests of the 
company.  
Shareholders should also not exercise exclusive powers to remove directors138 or this may 
undermine the appointment of stakeholder-nominated directors and the stature of 
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stakeholder covenants. We envisage that both shareholders or stakeholders have the right 
to propose removal, but that the nomination committee should make a final reasoned 
decision based on the best interests of the company as a whole. The nomination committee 
should consult shareholders and stakeholders extensively and provide a reasoned 
explanation to all. The implication from the above examples is that the adjustment of 
certain shareholder exclusive powers may concomitantly enhance the decision-making 
power of the Board. This is because in the alternative, enrolling consensus-based decision 
making among all stakeholder groups including shareholders may result in cumbersome and 
deadlocked processes. However the Board’s role should be accompanied by clear 
procedural provisions for transparency and accountability. 
Another example is in the adjustment of exclusive shareholder power in capital structuring 
or executive pay. At a very high level, many of these matters relate to preferences in terms 
of transfer of wealth/benefits. Hence, we propose that although shareholders or 
stakeholders have the right to move such proposals, they should be considered and 
consolidated by the Board acting a mediating mechanism and decision-maker whose 
accountability must be robust (a point we will turn to shortly).  
For example, company law could mandate that all Boards maintain an Ethics committee 
comprising of a group of independent directors, who would be responsible for scrutinising 
the objectives for and implications of any transfer of wealth decisions. The Ethics committee 
could be responsible for consulting shareholders and stakeholders thoroughly and for 
producing a reasoned recommendation to the Board on the appropriate course of action. 
The duty to consult is well-established to be procedural and does not rob the discretion of 
the committee139 from making a recommendation to the Board after due consideration of 
all representations. The committee can be made responsible for information analysis to all 
stakeholder groups, discussing the long-term implications of any transfers of wealth or 
benefits, and the bases for such transfers, whether in terms of efficiency, public interest, 
common good or distributive justice.  
Although we accept that as a matter of efficiency, the Board may be the final location to 
make certain decisions, we do not merely support director primacy140 as the organ that 
substitutes and centralises decision-making on behalf of all ‘capital’ providers.  
Our model recognises that different factions of agency can persist so the goals of holistic 
inclusion must be countervailed by restraint on all sides. We see shareholders and 
stakeholders ‘restrained’ by having their ‘rights’ mediated by Board consideration, instead 
of the previous regime where majority voting by shareholders would carry the day. On the 
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part of the Board, we see ‘restraint’ as being effected by greater requirements in the duty to 
consult, reasoned accountability and ex post enforcement (to be discussed shortly). Board 
decisions are further underpinned by regular monitoring and accountability through the 
channels of stakeholder covenants and the reservation of inclusive procedures for decision-
making that we will discuss shortly. Hence, our model is one where professional managerial 
capacity is expected and also empowered, but also where the relational paradigms in a 
company reflect more accurately, a diverse and more complex eco-system involving 
stakeholders, comprising of an overall system of checks and balances,141 a system that is 
more sophisticated and less simplistic than under the existing scheme of things, but 
nonetheless adequately matches the complexity of a company’s social profile and footprint. 
Hence, we envisage an effective and empowered Board underpinned by input monitoring 
and by legal redress as we shall discuss shortly. 
(b) Legal Reforms for Effective Directors on an Enhanced Board  
Board reforms are essential to ensure that Boards are effective to undertake the enhanced 
powers under our proposed adjustments to the power matrix in company law. Such Board 
reforms would need to be supported by reforms in company law.  
 Reform of s172, UK Companies Act 2006 and Legalisation of Board Responsibilities 
Directors’ conduct is currently governed by standards of loyalty, good faith, care and skill. 
We are of the view that these conduct standards remain relevant in order to constrain the 
exercise of powers within appropriate proscriptions and care. We support the duty to 
adhere to the company’s constitution and have advocated the extension to adherence to 
stakeholder covenants generally. We think the current section 172 of the UK Companies Act 
2006142 should be replaced, as such directors’ duty is singularly focused on shareholder 
primacy and fails to capture the modern complexities of Board responsibilities. Directors 
should be subject to a duty to engage in decision-making as a form of stewardship in their 
exercise of professional judgment towards the long-term good of the company as a whole, a 
notion endorsed by eminent commentators many years ago.143  
Company law should set out principles of Board responsibility, similar to that adopted in the 
UK Corporate Governance Code which applies to premium-listed companies on the London 
Stock Exchange. These responsibilities deal with strategic leadership on the Board, critical 
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discussion, appropriate risk appetite and management.144 We think appropriate stakeholder 
management should be added to the list. Board responsibilities should also include 
articulating the roles of committees of the Board, such as nomination, remuneration, risk, 
ethics or audit committees. The legalisation of Board responsibilities is not an entirely novel 
approach. Indeed in the financial sector, Board responsibilities have been legalised. In the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, the failure of bank Boards to appreciate certain risk-
taking and the observed disengagement or ineptitude on bank Boards145 have led policy-
makers to prescribe certain Board responsibilities as a matter of regulation,146 such as 
attention to strategic matters, adequate risk management and internal control, and 
comprehensive information reporting within the company. Of course the legalisation of 
board responsibilities in the financial sector is actionable by the relevant financial regulator, 
and is not a company law development as such. However, such developments can open the 
way for further thinking about how regulatory governance that reaches into the 
organisation can interface with the governance frameworks in company law. 
A concomitant director’s duty to adhere to the articulated Board or committee charter of 
responsibilities147  should also be introduced. We believe this to be necessary as directors’ 
omission to consider or take action is not adequately covered in the directors’ duties regime 
such as in the scope of the duty of ‘care and skill’.  For example, during the UK banking crisis 
of 2007-9, Northern Rock’s Board allowed executive management to operate a highly risky 
model of wholesale funding, and it was revealed that the Board of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland hastily approved of the acquisition of ABN-AMRO which proved to be fatal to the 
bank’s fortunes.148 Directors on both Boards have not been subject to any enforcement for 
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failures of duties largely because these directors would unlikely be regarded as having fallen 
short of due care and skill, or not having acted in the best interests of the company. As 
commented,149 the directors mentioned above would likely have been regarded as pursuing 
a business strategy in good faith, and indeed upon the advice of professionally appointed 
experts, therefore not falling short of the requirements of sections 172 or 174 of the 
Companies Act 2006.  
However, these directors clearly did not address their minds to risk management issues and 
failed to appreciate the wider sectoral risk implications of their institutions’ excessive risk-
taking.150  Hence, regulatory reforms in the financial sector have now introduced Board 
responsibility for risk management,151 as well as individual senior executive responsibility,152 
so that the failure of such responsibility may be made accountable through personal 
liability.153 This regulatory regime compensates for the lacuna in the general directors’ 
duties regime in company law but introduces duplication for directors’ responsibilities and 
some uneasy interfaces.154 There is a lesson to be learnt here with regard to whether 
directors’ duties in company law should be reformed to include responsibility-oriented 
obligations, and not just conduct-oriented obligations. Examples of responsibility-oriented 
obligations can be derived from the Board responsibilities statements already developed in 
the UK Corporate Governance Code,155 and some measure of inspiration can also be derived 
where relevant from the maps of responsibility for senior executives in banks and financial 
institutions drawn up by the relevant financial regulators.156  
 Qualities and Suitability of Directors 
Further, we believe that directors should be more robustly vetted to have certain qualities 
appropriate for the Board position to be assumed. Directors need to be both competent and 
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independent, and adequately trained in the specific matters in relation to the business. 
Although we do not think that directorial qualifications can be prescribed as the needs of 
different businesses vary, all directors, whether shareholder, stakeholder-nominated or 
independent must satisfy the nomination committee of the Board of the suitability of their 
profile.157  
Mayer also highlights the importance of independence being a predominant quality on the 
Board158 as strengthening directorial independence and quality of leadership is essential to 
ensuring a long-term focus for the company away from the perverse motivations stoked by 
shareholder primacy. The nomination committee should articulate and perhaps have a map 
of responsibilities for the different directorial positions on the Board, and have 
responsibility for ensuring that directors are suitable for their roles on the Board or relevant 
committee of the Board and professionally competent for those roles. We support the 
rejuvenation of directorial decision-making as expert professional judgments which are as 
objectively optimal as possible.159 Further, it may also be suggested that diversity policies of 
recruitment to the Board that further the Board’s optimality in competence and objectivity 
should be encouraged.160 
 Board Composition 
The suitability of directors should also be viewed as a holistic issue of Board composition, 
ensuring that the Board contains a balanced and adequate slate of skills and perspectives to 
act in the best interests of the company as a whole. The nomination committee plays a key 
role in ensuring optimal board composition. The nomination committee should comprise of 
independent directors who are qualified and dedicated to selecting an optimal Board 
composition and reviewing this regularly. Further, the nomination committee should make 
recommendations in terms of appointments to the various committees of the Board tasked 
to look after specific issues, such as remuneration, audit and risk. Further, as suggested 
earlier, we advocate that there should be a mandatory ethics and compliance committee 
which could look into issues of legal risk and responsibility, social and ethical responsibility 
and relations with stakeholders.  
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The enhancement of Board powers may be regarded as inadequately balanced if only 
framed by clearer responsibilities and expectations suggested above. We propose this new 
framework should be further supported in three ways. One is that directors should not be 
entrenched, and should have defined terms of tenure with limited renewal possibilities. 
Second, company law should provide for certain circumstances of inclusive decision-making 
where appropriate so that centralisation upon the Board is not excessive. The third is the 
design of appropriate enforcement mechanisms against directors. 
(c) Tenure of Directors 
We do not at this stage suggest prescriptive terms of tenure for directors, but we do not 
think short terms like a year or two especially in publicly listed companies are conducive to 
long-term thinking. Indeed a slate of three-to-five years perhaps extendable to eight years 
may strike the balance between incentivising directors to behave in a long-termist manner 
while not encouraging complacency that comes with entrenchment. This is underpinned by 
the right of shareholders and stakeholders to propose removal, as discussed above. In 
smaller private companies we see the possibility of longer terms of tenure as directors may 
also be controlling/founding shareholders and have a great interest in the long-term success 
of the company. We do not think there should be a compulsion to replace all such directors, 
as indeed they may be dedicated and constructive,161 but controlling director/shareholders 
may need to be checked by independent elements on the Board and the company’s 
stakeholders via covenants. 
(d) Directors’ Duty to act in Public or Overall Interest? 
It may be queried, since directors are to be in a position of enhanced powers, whether they 
should be subject to a duty to act for the ‘overall good’ or ‘public interest’ of the company? 
We do not advocate the institution of such a duty. Company law already requires directors 
to act in the company’s interest, i.e to consider the company as a whole. Although the 
current section 172 of the Companies Act draws equivalence between shareholders’ as a 
body and the company as a whole, antecedent case law in the UK162 arguably adopts a wider 
understanding of ‘company as a whole’. As we propose the repeal of section 172, the 
default position reverts to section 170 of the Companies Act which states quite clearly that 
directors’ duties are owed to the company.  
We also do not think instituting a directors’ duty in the public interest is appropriate as the 
company’s interest is not necessarily public interest, just as the company may not be 
expected to provide public goods. We refer to the example of the Irish institution of public 
interest directors after the extraordinary state bailout of certain banks. Even then, the UK 
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did not adopt this approach as this could mean that state owners of corporations are legally 
permitted to manipulate the corporate objective through appointment of ‘public interest 
directors’. The Irish approach is according to commentators still replete with legal anomalies 
and possible pitfalls.163 
(e) Proposal for Company-wide Consensual Decision-making in Specific Instances 
We think there are circumstances where an inclusive decision-making procedure involving 
all stakeholder groups may be warranted. For example, in exercising the power to ratify 
directors’ breaches of duties, we are of the view that a more inclusive procedure for 
ratifying such irregularity must be convened. There may be stakeholder implications for 
such breaches of duty, such as negative externalities to different extents for different 
stakeholders. This suggestion may seem rather cumbersome but the apparent increased 
inconvenience of more inclusive procedures may be outweighed by reasons of appropriate 
justice for those made to bear the company’s externalised cost. Hence, we are of the view 
that ratification proposals must be approved by the majority of all stakeholder groups. Such 
procedural demands could also compel directors to be more cautious in their decision-
making and discharge of their duties, bringing in an impact of a virtuous circle. 
Another situation we believe appropriate for inclusive decision-making is in business 
restructuring of the company. These episodes are not frequent by nature and often involve 
key turning points in the company’s business and structure. We believe that inclusive 
procedures should be designed to enrol stakeholder voice and even decision-making in 
these circumstances, as these episodes often fundamentally affect stakeholder relations 
with the company. Further, they do not occur so frequently as to justify arguments in 
relation to being cumbersome. 
However, it could be argued that (a) stakeholder covenants, including shareholders’ 
constitution with the company can be drafted to apportion decision-making powers within 
the company, therefore undermining Board responsibilities, and (b) inclusive decision-
making procedures cannot be made mandatory as there is no mandatory obligation to 
identify stakeholders. 
We think reforms in company law are necessary to address (a) and (b). In adjusting the 
power matrix in the company, we are necessarily introducing a new binary, not one 
between the Board and the general meeting, but one between stakeholder-centric issues 
and ‘whole-company’ issues. By streamlining all stakeholder relations with the company 
(including shareholders’ relations) to be covenant-based, it is important that stakeholder 
covenants only relate to matters that do not have implications for other stakeholder groups, 
or else such covenants can be used as arenas for competing interests to grab decision-
                                                          
163 Blanaid Clark and Gail E Henderson, ‘Directors as Guardians of the Public Interest: Lessons from the Irish 
Banking Crisis’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 187. 
making power over issues that may affect wider groups of stakeholders. In other words, 
shareholder covenants should not be used to reintroduce preserves of exclusive power 
where inappropriate. We see a need for company law to provide that stakeholder covenants 
cannot include certain matters, such as capital decisions, executive pay, ratification of 
directors’ breaches of duty, related party transactions, takeover offers, management-type 
decisions and the appointment of external gatekeepers such as the external auditor. 
We acknowledge that where (b) is concerned, inclusive decision-making procedures can 
only include already identified stakeholder groups by companies, i.e. those in covenantal 
relationships as those are regarded as integral and long-termist enough by the company to 
be accorded relational status. This brings us back to how excluded stakeholders may 
challenge their exclusion, and reforms to enforcement against directors. 
(f) Reform Proposal for Enforcement against Directors 
The reforms suggested in this article contain shareholder and stakeholder enforcement 
against companies within the framework of their respective covenants but our proposals 
also concomitantly enhance Board responsibility and power over ‘whole company’ issues. 
How is directorial discretion in the latter to be made accountable?  
 We believe that shareholder and stakeholder groups are both interested in calling directors 
to account for breaches of duty although their interests do not always coincide. Hence, we 
are of the view that although the company remains the primary person to sue in enforcing 
directors’ duties, the derivative action should be constituted as a form of enforcement that 
allows shareholders or stakeholders to sue in respect of breaches of directors’ duty if there 
are circumstances that prevent the company from suing. Thus, consistent with our proposal 
above in adjustment of shareholders’ exclusive powers, we consider the right to take a 
derivative action to be one that needs to be reformed to conform to the stakeholder 
conception of company law. This is necessary as shareholders should not be relied upon for 
enforcement in all relevant cases.  
Enforcement of Directors’ Duties- The Public Interest Dimension 
We recognise that private enforcement by shareholders extended to covenantal 
stakeholders above may not address issues such as grievances of excluded stakeholder 
groups. We think it is plausible to introduce a form of ‘public interest litigation’ that can 
primarily be actionable by excluded groups which would like to challenge their exclusion. 
This action can be framed to be subject to the same barriers as currently established for 
derivative actions164 in order to weed out frivolous and vexatious litigation without real 
merit.  
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If a company is a publicly traded company, we believe that the securities regulator would 
have a role to play in standard-setting as well as enforcement aspects relating to a 
stakeholder conception in corporate governance. Securities regulators increasingly see the 
relevance of corporate governance to listing standards, 165 and are in a position to further 
refine the standards for a stakeholder conception in publicly listed companies and to 
enforce them. We will not pursue this tangent in detail in this article as we focus on 
company law across the board. However we see the potential of securities regulator led 
enforcement where companies have excluded certain stakeholders or are in breach of 
corporate governance standards. Where shareholders and stakeholders may have less clout 
or bargaining power, the regulator’s intervention, where appropriate, could be highly 
constructive.  
It is queried whether shareholders or stakeholders should be able to take actions to 
challenge a company’s entering into a stakeholder covenant. We do not think such actions 
are impossible or ought to be excluded, although such actions may appear to be contests 
between different factions of stakeholders and can be damaging and disruptive for the 
company. However we are of the view that the procedural barriers discussed above as 
found in section 263(3) of the Companies Act 2006 ought to be able to weed out 
unmeritorious allegations. For example, an application of section 263(3) criteria would 
require that claimants prove that a hypothetical reasonable director would think it in the 
best interests of the company to pursue the claim, or that the claim is pursued in good 
faith,166 a burden for the claimant to discharge.167 
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In sum, we believe that an expansion of directors’ duties towards responsibilities-oriented 
content, and the introduction of expanded enforcement avenues available to all 
stakeholders and those who challenge their exclusion, would provide a robust regime for 
legal redress against directors who enjoy a wider berth of power under our proposals. This 
would bring in a new system of corporate governance. Of course the sum of our reforms 
requires some heavy lifting and new interpretive jurisprudence from courts, although we 
have pointed out how existing legal and regulatory frameworks provide lessons for 
analogous interpretation. 
D. Conclusion 
Many debates in company law revolve around the theoretical and normative bases for 
shareholder primacy and stakeholderism and essentially, the contest between the two. This 
essay is in support of a stakeholder conception of company law but argues that we need to 
courageously imagine its operationalisation so that the ‘current scheme of things’ does not 
operate as a per se barrier to reform. In light of the perversities and negative externalities 
that have entailed from corporate conduct that is only on the basis of narrowly-framed 
shareholder primacy, we argue that it is time for reform, and that a blueprint for such can 
be set out. The blueprint proposed in this essay requires adjustment of the power matrix in 
company law but envisages professionally competent and dedicated managers supported by 
more complex channels of consultation, monitoring and enforcement. It is intended to 
support the company as the modern engine of wealth creation, as both an efficient 
economic organisation and a legitimate societal institution. 
